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We can characterize computationalism very generally as a complex thesis 
with two main parts: the thesis that the brain (or the nervous system) is 
a computational system and the thesis that neural computation explains 
cognition. As Piccinini and Bahar (2012) point out, over the last six decades, 
computationalism has been the mainstream theory of cognition. Nevertheless, 
there is still substantial debate about which type of computation explains 
cognition, and computationalism itself still remains controversial. My aim in 
this paper is to make two main contributions to the debate about the first sub-
thesis of computationalism, i.e. that the brain is a computational system. First, 
I want to offer an accurate elucidation of the notion relevant for understanding 
computationalism (the notion of computation) and clarify the relation between 
computation and information as well as the relations between both computation 
and information processing and the nervous system. Second, I want to argue 
against a peculiar form of computationalism: the thesis that neural processes 
are constitutively computational in some sense; that neural processes cannot 
be realized by a system that is not in some sense computational. I will call this 
thesis “modal computationalism.” In particular, I want to argue that neural 
processing can be realized by a system that is not a sui generis computer (i. e., 
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a computing system that is neither digital nor analog) and by a system that is 
not a generic computer (a computer in the most general sense: one that includes 
digital, analog, and any other kind of computation). Actual neural processing is 
presumed to be computational in these two senses (Piccinini and Bahar 2012). 
I will argue that, even if this is true,  neural processing can be realized by a 
computing system that is not of the same kind as those that perform actual 
neural processing and even by a system that is not computational at all.
Key words: semantic information, computationalism, feedback control, 
neural computation, generic computation
1. Introduction
We can characterize computationalism very generally as a complex thesis 
with two main parts: the thesis that the brain (or the nervous system) is 
a computational system and the thesis that neural computation explains 
cognition. As Piccinini and Bahar (2012) point out, over the last six 
decades, computationalism has been the mainstream theory of cognition. 
Nevertheless, there is still substantial debate about which type of 
computation explains cognition, and computationalism itself still remains 
controversial. My aim in this paper is to make two main contributions to 
the debate about the first sub-thesis of computationalism, i.e. that the brain 
is a computational system. First, I want to offer an accurate elucidation 
of the notion relevant for understanding computationalism (the notion of 
computation) and clarify the relation between information and computation 
as well as the relation of computation and information processing to 
the nervous system. Second, I want to argue against a peculiar form 
of computationalism: the thesis that neural processing is constitutively 
computational in some sense; that neural processing cannot be realized by a 
system that is not in some sense computational. I will call this thesis modal 
computationalism. In particular, I want to argue that neural processing 
can be realized by a system that is not a sui generis computer (i.e. a 
computing system that is neither digital nor analog) and by a system that 
is not a generic computer (a computer in the most general sense, which 
includes analog, digital, and any other kind of computation). Actual neural 
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processing is presumed to be computational in these two senses (Piccinini 
and Bahar 2012). I will argue that neural processing can be realized by a 
computing system that is not of the same kind as the ones that perform 
actual neural processing and even by a system that is not computational 
at all. It is important to point out that, as we will see later, even if one is 
not interested in the forms of modal computationalism I will consider 
here, the elucidations of the relevant concepts that I will offer in the first 
part of the paper will be useful more generally to consider any form of 
computationalism. 
Piccinini and Scarantino (2011) take on an important philosophical task in 
the context of this debate. The authors elucidate the concepts of computation 
and information, and they draw two main conclusions about how these 
concepts are related. First, they show that every notion of computation is 
different from every notion of information. Second, they then affirm that 
the three main notions of information (Shannon’s non-semantic notion, 
natural semantic information, and non-natural semantic information) imply 
the generic notion of computation. This can be important in the debate, 
because if the neural processing is empirically established to be performed 
by an information processing system, it follows that neural processing is 
computational in the generic sense. This is the second argument for generic 
computationalism that Piccinini and Bahar (2012) offer. The first argument 
is based on the fact that the nervous system has the central feature of a 
generic computational system: medium independent vehicles. Piccinini 
and Bahar also argue against digital and analog computationalism. They 
posit that although the nervous system computes, the kind of computation 
it performs is neither digital nor analog, i.e., it is a sui generis kind of 
computation. 
This paper has two main parts. In the first part (sections 2.1 and 2.2), I will 
consider the concepts of information processing and generic computation, 
the relation they have to each other, and the relation they have to the 
nervous system. In section 2.1, by comparing the notions of computation 
and information, I will show that computation is best characterized as 
the manipulation of vehicles that have what I call “restricted functional 
relevance.” I will then show that information processing does not imply 
computation. In section 2.2, I will argue that information processing is 
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related to the nervous system in a stronger way than computation is. I 
believe that feedback control, the function peculiar to neural activity, 
implies information processing, but not computation. To argue for this 
thesis I will consider and criticize the elucidation of the notion of feedback 
control offered by Wimsatt (1971). I believe that even a very strong notion 
of feedback (such as Wimsatt’s) does not imply computation and that 
even the much weaker notion of feedback I defend implies information 
processing. 
With these conceptual tools, in the second part (sections 3.1 and 3.2), I 
argue against the types of computationalism that Piccinini and Bahar (2012) 
defend: generic and sui generis. In each of these cases, “computationalism” 
will be taken in a different sense than Piccinini and Bahar treat it. 
Therefore, my theses will be compatible with theirs. Piccinini and Bahar 
argue that actual neural processing is performed by sui generis and 
generic computers. I will argue that, even if we accept that position, neural 
processing can be realized in a system that is neither a sui generis nor a 
generic computer. In section 3.1, I show that feedback control is constitutive 
of neural processing and distinguish it, in this respect, from computation 
and information processing. This means that feedback control is the only 
one of these features (computation, information processing, and feedback 
control) that is needed for the realization of neural processing. The other 
features (computation and information processing) will be (indirectly) 
needed for the realization of neural processing only if they are necessary 
for the realization of a feedback control system. I will then argue that, 
since feedback control is compatible with digital and analog computation, 
sui generis computation is not constitutive of neural processing. Neural 
processing does not need sui generis computation to be realized. Thus, I 
maintain that a form of sui generis computationalism is false. In section 
3.2, I will argue that since feedback control can be realized even by a 
system that is not computational at all, as feedback control does not need 
generic computation to be realized,  computation in the generic sense is not 
constitutive of neural processing. A form of generic computationalism is 
also false. The peculiarity of these forms of computationalism is that they 
are answers to modal questions about the relation between computation 
and the neural processing, questions that lead us to consider the range of 
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multiple realizability of these kind of processes. 
2. Computation, Information Processing, and the Nervous System
2.1. Computation and Information Processing 
Piccinini and Scarantino (2011) distinguish three main notions of 
information: a non- semantic, a natural semantic, and a non-natural 
semantic notion. The notion formalized by Shannon (1948) is non-semantic 
in that a piece of information in his sense is fully characterized by two 
features: it is a physical structure distinguishable from a set of alternative 
physical structures, and it belongs to an exhaustive set of mutually 
exclusive selectable physical structures with well-defined probabilities. No 
semantic property is involved in its individuation. However, an information 
theorist could be also interested in the specific content of a given piece 
of information. Piccinini and Scarantino (2011) borrow Grice’s (1957) 
distinction between natural and non-natural meaning and apply it to 
semantic information. A case of natural meaning could be exemplified by 
the sentence, “those spots mean measles,” which is true only in the case that 
the patient has measles. Non-natural meaning is exemplified by a sentence 
like “those three rings on the bus bell mean that the bus is full,” which is 
true even if the bus is not full. Similarly, we classify information as natural 
when there is a physical, reliable correlation between two states. Spots carry 
information about measles only when the spots are reliably correlated with 
measles. On the contrary, the ringing of the bus bell   carries information 
about the bus being full by virtue of a convention. 
So, given this characterization of semantic information, what determines 
whether an object o or event e is a token of a certain informational 
vehicle type I? The obvious answer is that whether an event e or object 
o belongs to an informational type I depends on the kind of information 
it carries. But the information that an object carries, as we have seen, is 
fully determined by the reliable correlation that the object or event has 
with tokens of an object or event type T or by the convention that links 
the object and the tokens of T. So, we can say that an object o or event e 
belongs to an informational type I if and only if it has a reliable correlation 
with tokens of an event type T or there exists a convention that links o 
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or e with tokens of T. But is there something else that is necessary for an 
object to belong to an informational type I? Particularly, do the structural 
or intrinsic properties of o or e play some role in the determination of their 
informational type? I believe that, since the correlation of an object with Ts 
or the convention that links that object with Ts is a sufficient condition to 
belong to I, structural properties of o or e will be necessary for belonging 
to I only if those structural properties of o or e are necessary for having 
a correlation with tokens of T or forming a convention that links o or e 
with Ts. However, I think that this is not the case. Two events that share no 
structural properties can be correlated with the same event type and thereby 
carry the same information. For example, for a predator, the specific scent 
s of prey p that reaches its olfactory system and some pattern of light l that 
reaches its visual organs from p share no structural properties, but both 
can be reliably correlated with (and thereby carry information about) the 
presence of p. Both events can belong to the same informational type I (the 
type of informational vehicles that carry information about the presence of 
p) although they share no structural property. Another ordinary example of 
this feature of natural semantic information could be this: smoke and my 
concept FIRE do not share any structural property functionally relevant for 
the reliable correlation they both can have with fire. The fact that semantic 
non-natural information has the same feature is more obvious, given that 
conventions can be more or less arbitrary. What is important about this 
phenomenon (i.e., that vehicles that carry the same information and belong 
to the same informational type can share no structural properties) is that 
it shows the multiple realizability of informational vehicles. Vehicles of 
information processing can be realized in completely different physical 
bases, i.e., physical bases that have no common intrinsic or structural 
property. I think this feature is important in comparing vehicles of 
information processing with vehicles of computation. 
 The more general notion of computation, the notion of generic 
computation, is introduced by Piccinini and Scarantino as a way to capture 
“all the relevant uses of ‘computation’ in cognitive science” (2011, p. 10). 
Piccinini and Scarantino affirm that “generic computation is the processing 
of vehicles according to rules that are sensitive to certain vehicle properties 
and, specifically, to differences between different portions of the vehicles” 
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(2011, p. 10). Piccinini and Bahar (2012) characterize the rules that define 
generic computation more specifically: 
“the rules (i.e., the input-output maps) that define a computation are 
sensitive only to differences between portions of the vehicles along 
specific dimensions of variation—they are insensitive to any more 
concrete physical properties of the vehicles” (pp. 6-7) 
Piccinini and Scarantino call this kind of vehicles “medium independent” 
because this characteristic property makes possible the multiple realizability 
of computational vehicles, i.e., that a given computation be implemented 
in different physical media (mechanical, electromechanical, electronic, 
magnetic, etc.). A computational vehicle type can be realized in a variety 
of media because very specific or concrete physical properties are not 
necessary for its realization. 
I believe that there is a property that informational and computational 
vehicles share, and I will follow Piccinini and Bahar in calling it “medium 
independence.” But I also believe that this property is not identical to 
the defining property of computational vehicles. So, I will use the term 
“restricted functional relevance” to refer to the defining property of 
computational vehicles and keep the term “medium independence” to 
refer to the property that I believe both kinds of vehicle share. I believe 
that “restricted functional relevance” better captures the more specific 
property of computational vehicles and that “medium independence” better 
captures the more general one (the one I think it is shared by computational 
and informational vehicles). I will maintain that computational and 
informational vehicles are similar only in that they do not depend on a 
particular physical medium for their realization, i.e., in that they both have 
multiple realizability. So, I will use “medium independence” to refer only 
to multiple realizability (knowing that this a wider sense than the one given 
by Piccinini and Bahar to the same expression). But, I will affirm that while 
computational vehicles exhibit this multiple realizability because their 
intrinsic functionally relevant properties are abstract, informational vehicles 
have multiple realizability because their defining property is relational, 
not intrinsic. So, by “restricted functional relevance” I mean only that the 
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functionally relevant properties of computational vehicles, according to 
Piccinini and Bahar’s definition, are not very specific or concrete. I believe 
that Piccinini and Bahar are correct in thinking that both being a vehicle of 
information processing and having what I refer to as “restricted functional 
relevance” conceptually imply having multiple realizability. Nevertheless, 
I will argue that being informational and having restricted functional 
relevance are not extensionally equivalent concepts. So, information 
processing does not imply computation. 
We have seen that, since a vehicle of informational type I is fully 
characterized by some relational property its tokens have with tokens of 
states or events of type E (be it a causal correlation or a convention), no 
particular structural property is required for the realization of the tokens 
of I. Two states that share no structural properties can both be tokens of 
I if they correlate with tokens of type E events (or if they are linked by a 
convention with type E events). We saw this with the visual/olfactory prey 
detection and smoke/FIRE examples above. I also said that it is this feature 
of informational vehicles that makes them multiple realizable or medium 
independent. On the other side, the feature of computational vehicles that 
make them medium independent is not their relational character, but rather 
the fact that the features that define them are not very specific or concrete. 
Computational vehicles can be realized in different physical bases because 
very abstract properties of them are functionally relevant. For example, 
for a component of a system to be a token of an analog computation 
vehicle type, the functionally relevant states of that component only need 
to be continuous. To be a token of a digital computation vehicle type , the 
functionally relevant aspects need to be discrete. For the component to 
be a token of a specific digital or analog vehicle type, even more specific 
structural properties will be required. However, as there will be many 
other aspects of these tokens that will not be functionally relevant, they 
will be medium independent. On the contrary, we have seen that the 
realization of informational vehicles does not impose any restriction on 
their specific structural properties. In particular, it is not required that 
the functionally relevant aspects of an informational vehicle token v be 
restricted to more abstract aspects of v. Any informational vehicle type can 
be realized in a token that has no restricted functional relevance, whose 
261Modal Considerations on Information Processing and Computation ~
functionally relevant properties are very specific or concrete. Therefore, 
being informational and having restricted functional relevance are not 
extensionally equivalent concepts.
I said above that restricted functional relevance was the common feature 
of computational vehicles. The medium independence of vehicles of 
both digital and analog computation follows from the fact that not very 
specific properties of them are functionally relevant. If being informational 
and having restricted functional relevance are concepts that are not 
extensionally equivalent but that both imply medium independence, then 
the concepts of medium independence and restricted functional relevance 
are not extensionally equivalent either (the notion of medium independence 
will apply to token vehicles that have no restricted functional relevance; 
namely, some informational vehicle tokens). We therefore cannot define 
computational vehicles as medium independent, but rather only as vehicles 
of restricted functional relevance. I think that Piccinini and Scarantino, in 
defining generic computation, identified the correct property, yet they failed 
to characterize it appropriately. They realized that what I call restricted 
functional relevance was the defining property of generic computation, 
but they characterized it as medium independence, as the property shared 
by computational and informational vehicles. With this in mind, we can 
further conclude, more importantly, that because information processing 
does not imply restricted functional relevance, and since computation must 
be defined as the manipulation of vehicles of restricted functional relevance, 
then information processing does not imply computation. 
To summarize, I have argued that medium independence and restricted 
functional relevance are different concepts. The notions of restricted 
functional relevance and being informational are not extensionally 
equivalent, but they both imply medium independence. This means that 
medium independence (understood as multiple realizability) does not 
imply restricted functional relevance, and therefore we cannot define 
computational vehicles as medium independent, but only as vehicles 
of restricted functional relevance. From this it follows, contrary to the 
affirmations of Piccinini and Scarantino, that medium independence of 
informational vehicles does not imply their computational character. 
In the next section, I will examine the distinction between information 
262   Abel Wajnerman Paz 
and computation considering not those concepts themselves, but rather 
their relation to the concept of feedback control, the main function of 
the nervous system. As I stated above, this will be important later (in 
sections 3.1 and 3.2) to argue against a form of generic and sui generis 
computationalism. As I will argue later that feedback control is constitutive 
of neural processing (that it is the most adequate criterion for assessing the 
range of its multiple realizability), the conceptual relations that feedback 
control has with computation and information processing (as the conceptual 
relation established in this section between computation and information 
processing) will be relevant to determine whether computation itself is 
constitutive of neural processing. 
2.2. Computational and Informational Feedback Control 
In the previous section, I offered an elucidation of computation and argued 
against the implication from information processing to computation. This 
makes the line between computation and information processing sharper 
than it seemed in Piccinini and Scarantino’s explanation. In this section, 
I will further distinguish computation and information processing in 
terms of their relation to the nervous system. I will argue that information 
processing, but not computation, is constitutive of feedback control, the 
function peculiar to neural activity. In particular, I think that even a very 
strong notion of neural feedback does not imply computation and that even 
a very weak notion of neural feedback implies information processing.  
Feedback control is the function that is specific to neural activity. The 
specific function of neural activity differentiates the nervous system from 
other functionally organized systems. The nervous system belongs in the 
class of feedback control systems together with autopilot systems, for 
instance. Piccinini and Bahar (2012) note that the thesis of the nervous 
system as a feedback control system is not trivial and took serious scientific 
work to establish rigorously (Cannon 1932). Nevertheless, by now it is 
uncontroversial, though there is still substantial debate on the nature of 
feedback control itself. Piccinini and Bahar characterize nervous feedback 
saying that the nervous system controls the behavior of an organism 
in response to stimuli coming from both the organism’s body and the 
environment, including the ef fects of  the nervous system itsel f . So, 
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according to this characterization, to execute feedback control over a larger 
system S of which it is a part, a system S1 only needs to cause states in S 
(control the behavior of S) in a way that depends on previous states of S 
itself or its environment (in response to stimuli coming from them) that are 
previous effects of S1 itself. Thus, if we have feedback control of a system 
S1 over a system S, there will be a reliable causal correlation between 
previous states of S or its environment caused by S1, internal states of S1, 
and new states caused in S by S1. 
I believe that this characterization of feedback control is basically correct. 
What is constitutive of feedback is the causal loop I have just described 
between previous effects of the feedback systems and new effects. I 
think that this is all we need for a system to execute feedback control. 
Nevertheless, in light of recent discussion on the notion of feedback, I feel 
I need to offer a defense of this characterization. The notion presented by 
Wimsatt (1971)1 is much more demanding than Piccinini and Bahar’s. First, 
I will argue that even this stronger notion does not imply computation 
(neither sui generis nor generic). Second, I will defend the weaker notion 
presented above. Finally, I will argue that even this weaker notion implies 
information processing. 
Before entering into the debate about feedback control, there is a further 
constraint for neural feedback control that is absent in Piccinini and Bahar’ 
s characterization and that we should emphasize. Neural feedback control 
is negative. Very roughly, feedback control is negative when the value of 
the output signal is diminished by the system when the value of the same 
variable goes beyond a certain threshold. In this section, I will be concerned 
exclusively with characterizations of this notion of negative feedback. 
There has been substantial debate about the nature of feedback control. 
I believe that Wimsatt (1971) has contributed two ideas that are very 
relevant for thinking about the relation between feedback, computation, 
and information. Wimsatt (1971) argues that feedback control cannot 
be characterized solely in behavioral terms, that is, in terms of a certain 
correlation between specific inputs and outputs of a system. This means that 
1 I am in debt to a referee of the Journal of Cognitive Science for encouraging me 
to examine my theses on the light of Wimsatt’s stronger notion of feedback control.
264   Abel Wajnerman Paz 
to determine if a system executes feedback control, one has to determine, 
to some extent, the nature of its internal structure. This is important for 
our purposes, because whether feedback control implies computation 
depends exactly on how strong those constraints on the internal structure 
of feedback control systems are. Wimsatt (1971) also argues that two 
very widely accepted conditions to characterize the internal structure of a 
feedback control system are not sufficient. Nevertheless, he accepts them 
as necessary. In what follows, I will advance three theses. First, I will argue 
that even the notion of negative feedback that includes the constraints on 
the internal structure of a negative feedback system that Wimsatt mentions 
as necessary conditions does not imply computation (neither sui generis nor 
generic). Secondly, I will argue that those constraints are not even necessary 
for negative feedback. I will defend a weaker notion of negative feedback. 
Lastly, I will argue that even this weaker notion implies information 
processing.      
Wimsatt considers three constraints that have been widely accepted 
for feedback control systems. The first two appear in the elucidation of 
feedback control given by authors such as Beckner (1959), Ashby (1960), 
Sommerhof (1950), and Nagel (1961). They claim that a feedback control 
system requires: (1) power to compensate for environmental changes that 
might impede the system’s progress towards the goal; and (2) independent 
variables that define the system and its environment. It seems clear that the 
second condition does not imply that feedback control vehicles must be 
computational. It simply requires that there be two logically independent, 
but causally related, variables in the system in addition to environmental 
variables. This second condition puts no restriction on the specific nature of 
those variables (they could be discrete or continuous, medium-dependent 
or medium-independent, etc.). Thus, this condition alone makes it possible 
for vehicles of feedback control to be instantiated in a non sui generis 
computational system or even in a system that is not computational at all. 
The first condition, the one that specifies the compensation of negative 
feedback, determines a more specific task for those variables. We will come 
back to this in a moment.
The third condition is that a system be capable of reaching the same set 
of equilibrium values for its state variables from an arbitrarily large range 
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of different initial values of the state variables (this is the primary feature 
of Braithwaite’s (1953) analysis). Von Bertalanffy called this phenomenon 
‘equifinality,’ and both he and Kacser (1957) have given formal analyses 
of this phenomenon for open systems of the general type which Wimsatt 
claims are not feedback systems. So, although this feature could be 
necessary for feedback control, it is not sufficient.
The first condition, the ‘compensatory’ phenomenon frequently invoked, 
states that changes in one (or more) state variable(s) will be partially or 
wholly compensated for by changes in one or more other state variables in 
such a way that the original perturbed variable(s) will be wholly or partially 
restored to their ‘normal’ equilibrium values. This phenomenon has been 
described by Kacser (1957) as ‘buffering,’ a word which is a better clue to 
its real significance than those employed in the analyses mentioned above. 
The first and third features are clearly related. Equifinality describes the 
effect of compensation. The compensation condition gives the mechanism 
by which this ‘equifinality’ of non-equilibrium states is brought about: some 
variables ‘take the load’ from the ‘stressed’ variables and allow them to 
partially or completely approach or regain their ‘normal’ values. 
Wimsatt shows that the condition of compensation, like the condition of 
equifinality, could be necessary for feedback control, but is not sufficient. 
He describes two mechanisms that satisfy the compensation condition, 
but the first of them is not a feedback control system. The feature that 
the second has, but not the first does not, is a further necessary condition 
for feedback control that Wimsatt introduces. I will claim that neither 
compensation nor equifinality are necessary for feedback control, and 
that the additional condition that one should extract from Wimsatt’s 
model is just the causal loop that we described above (the causal loop that 
characterizes a negative feedback system).
Before arguing for the weaker notion of negative feedback control, I want 
to argue that even these stronger requirements do not imply computation. 
The condition of equifinality requires that the internal variables of the 
system be able to reach an equilibrium value from an arbitrarily large set of 
values. The condition of compensation requires that this must be done by 
making other variables take the load of the stressed variables. The variables 
that are above a certain threshold must go back to a value below that 
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threshold (their equilibrium value) by raising the values of other variables. 
It can easily be seen that these restrictions do not imply that negative 
feedback vehicles should be non-digital or non-analog like actual neural 
vehicles. The capacity of a variable to go back to an equilibrium value and 
the capacity of a variable to take the load of another variable (increase 
its value if the value of the other decreases) imposes no restriction to the 
nature of those values. It only requires that certain changes of value of the 
variables be possible and that certain correlations between the values of 
the variables be given. However, this leaves open the possibility that the 
values themselves may be continuous or discrete. Neural feedback control 
therefore does not imply sui generis computation. Furthermore, these 
restrictions also leave open the possibility that the functionally relevant 
aspects of the variables may be very specific or concrete. Therefore, neural 
feedback control does not imply restricted functional relevance. Neural 
feedback does not imply computation. Nevertheless, I think that the 
notion of feedback does not even require these two structural requisites of 
equifinality and compensation. This will make the two points made about 
feedback and computation even more obvious.
Wimsatt presents two hydrodynamic models involving the flow of water 
into and out of a pair of interconnected tanks. The non-feedback system 
consists of two geometrically congruent tanks of constant cross-section 
interconnected by an orifice with an input of water at the top of one of the 
tanks at a specific rate r1 and with an output magnitude r0 in an orifice at 
the bottom of the other tank. Water passes through the connecting orifice 
at another specific rate rs (that is positive if flow moves from the first tank 
to the second). rs is a function of the water level of the two tanks (l1 and l2), 
the gravitational force g, and the area of the orifice that connects them. The 
condition of equilibrium is given in the situation in which the values of l1 
and l2 are proportional to each other, they are proportional to r0,  to r1, and 
to rs, and these three values are equal. In the situation in which the value 
of l2 is superior to the value of l1, rs will be negative, although r0 and r1 will 
remain positive. The flow of water from one tank to the other will reverse 
until l1 and l2 reach their equilibrium values. When they do, rs will go back 
to its equilibrium value too. This simple open system thus exhibits both 
of the features supposedly sufficient for a feedback system: (1) the system 
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tends to approach equilibrium values from arbitrary non-equilibrium states, 
and (2) the system ‘buffers,’ as an unusually high value of the variable 
of second tank has been partially compensated for by an increase in the 
variable in the first tank. 
Nevertheless, the second model will show why this first is not a feedback 
control system. In the second model, we again have two interconnected 
tanks, but there is also a pressure sensor at the output r0 of the second tank 
that detects changes in r0 (and, as the two variables are connected, it also 
detects changes in l2) and is connected to a variable input valve that controls 
r1 in such a way that deviations from the equilibrium values of r0 and l1 are 
counteracted by changes in r1.
Wimsatt holds that the main difference between these two systems is that 
in the first, the compensation between the two internal variables depends 
on the possibility that the flow from the first variable to the second being 
reversible. In the second model, compensation can take place without this 
reversible character. I believe that it is another difference which determines 
that only the second is a feedback control system. Recall that a very 
intuitive required feature of feedback control system (the one that made 
us, through an argument that Wimsatt (1971, pp. 244-246) offers, reject 
the behavioristic account of feedback) is that there must be some kind of 
‘causal loop.’ There must be a causal relation between the actual state of 
the output variable of the system and previous states of that same variable. 
That is why Wimsatt showed that we cannot give a behavioristic criteria 
for feedback control. If any input-output matrix can be reproduced by a net 
that has no loops, then, although we may find a system in which there is a 
correlation between values in the output variable and previous values of the 
same variable, this could be done without there being any causal relation 
between those values. In the case of the second pair of tanks, we find just 
this kind of loop required for feedback control. When a certain value at 
the output variable r0 is given, this causes a change in the input variable r1 
which, in turn, changes the value of l1. The decrease of the input flow of 
water r1, given that the flow rate rs from the first tank to the second remains 
constant, causes a decrease of the level of water in the first tank, l1. This, in 
turn, causes a decrease in the rate rs of the flow from the first to the second 
tank (given that this rate is, in part, a function of the level of the first tank, 
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l1). The decrease in rs (given that the output r0 still has the same value) 
causes a decrease in the level of the second tank, l2, and this finally causes a 
decrease in the value of r0, whose original value initiated this result. 
In the first pair of tanks we simply do not have a causal loop like this. It is 
not the value at r0 in a past moment that causes the decrease of the value of 
r0 at a present moment. When r0 has certain value, this depends on the level 
of water of the second tank, l2, and the value of this variable causes the 
decrease in the value of rs which, in turn, causes a decrease of the value of 
l2. This decrease in l2 causes a decrease in r0. So, a value of l2 at a moment 
t0 has two dif ferent causal paths: one of them leads directly to a certain 
value of r0 at a time t1. The other leads to a modification of l2 itself at t2  
(through the modification of rs at t1). This new value of l2 at t2 leads, in turn, 
to a new value for r0 at t3. But the first value of the output variable r0 at t1 
is not involved in the production of its new value at t3. So, here we have 
a case where there is only a correlation, but not a causal relation between 
actual states of the output variable of the system and its previous states. I 
believe that this feature, which the first system lacks, is what is necessary 
for feedback control. 
Furthermore, I believe that this model shows that one of the other 
conditions supposedly required for feedback control, compensation, is not 
necessary. It must be noted that the second system is a feedback control 
system according to Wimsatt, but no compensation occurs between its 
internal variables. The decrease of the value of r0 is caused by the decrease 
of the values of all the other variables (first r1, then l1, rs, and finally l2). 
There is no variable ‘taking the load’ from the high value of r0. Therefore, 
compensation is not necessary for feedback control. 
Additionally, I believe that the form of equifinality required is much 
weaker than the one described. In particular, the equifinality I believe we 
should demand does not imply anything about the internal structure of 
the system. Recall that the equifinality of a system, as described, is that 
it is capable of reaching the same set of equilibrium values for its state 
variables from an arbitrarily large range of different initial values of the 
state variables. Restricted just to an output variable, such as Wimsatt’s r0, 
this is simply part of the description of the causal loop required for negative 
feedback. This system is a negative feedback system because r0 can go 
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from an arbitrarily large range of states back to its equilibrium value. 
However, it seems that the condition of equifinality requires that all the 
internal variables of the system have this property. I think that this is false. 
Why should we require this for negative feedback? I believe that in many 
systems (such as the two models presented by Wimsatt), this is the only way 
that we can have the kind of causal loop required for the output variable. 
In both systems, when the output variable r0 goes beyond a threshold T, the 
other variables must change their values (some must increase their values, 
other reduce it, depending on the system) until the output variable has 
reached its equilibrium value E. But when r0 has reached E, all the other 
variables in Wimsatt’s systems must go back to their previous value so that 
r0 stops decreasing. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily so. A system can 
be a feedback system, having an output variable with the relevant kind of 
causal loop, without its internal variables having the capacity to go back to 
a certain value from an arbitrarily large set of values. 
Suppose there is a system S that consists of two tapes, A and B, a device 
D1 that writes or erases symbols on A, a device D2 that writes symbols on B, 
and a sensor S that detects the number of letters on A (SA) and the number 
of letters on B (SB) and that is connected to D1 and D2. D1 keeps writing 
symbols on A unless D2 writes symbols on B. Furthermore, each time D2 
writes a symbol on B, this causes D1 to erase a symbol on A. When S senses 
that SA has passed a certain threshold T, it makes D2 start writing symbols 
on B, and thereby makes D1 erase symbols from A until SA reaches certain 
value V below T. V is the equilibrium value for the variable SA of the 
system. SA reaches V through the modification (specifically, the increase) 
of the value of the other relevant variable (SB). But SB has no equilibrium 
value. The value of SB will keep rising each time SA passes T. Nevertheless, 
this system is clearly a negative feedback control system. There is an output 
variable SA of S that can go beyond a value T, and when this happens, it 
causes an internal process that culminates with the decrease of the value of 
SA to V. This is the kind of causal loop required for negative feedback, and 
it does not require equifinality. 
Therefore, the only requisite necessary for feedback control that remains 
is that which appeared in Piccinini and Bahar’s characterization: the outputs 
of the system must depend causally on previous effects of the system itself. 
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And since neural feedback is negative, we can add the restriction that the 
output must be an equilibrium value of a variable caused by previous non-
equilibrium values of the same variable. As this characterization puts even 
less restrictions on the internal states of the system, it seems clear that it 
does not imply sui generis or generic computation. It only requires that 
those internal states correlate the actual equilibrium value of the output 
with the previous non-equilibrium ones.   
We can now consider the relation between feedback control and 
information processing. I will argue that even the weak notion of feedback 
that I defend implies information processing. This relation between 
feedback control and information processing is conspicuously absent in 
Piccinini and Bahar’s work. They only claim that the complexity of the 
feedback control performed by the nervous system makes it necessary for 
the nervous system to process internal variables that carry information 
about external variables: 
[I]n order to exert sufficiently complex control functions, the only 
efficient way to perform feedback control is to possess and process 
internal variables that correlate reliably with relevant external variables. 
These internal variables must be processed based on the natural 
information they carry. (2012, p. 4) 
They do not elaborate, however, on why the complexity of feedback control 
makes information processing necessary, nor do they comment on whether 
the necessity is conceptual, empirical, or of some other nature. In what 
follows, I will claim that the weaker notion of negative feedback control 
conceptually entails information processing.
According to the weaker notion defended, there must be at least two 
internal states of a negative feedback control system. The negative feedback 
loop requires one state S1 that detects a deviation of the output variable 
O from its equilibrium value E and causes O to decrease or increase, and 
another state S2 that responds to O being at E and causes the decrease or 
increase of the value of O to stop. But this is all that is required to be an 
information processing system: that internal states carry information (S1 
about not-E and S2 about E) and that states that carry different information 
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have different causal roles so that we can talk about the system responding 
to the information of its vehicles (S1 causes the variation of O’s value and 
S2 causes the variation to stop). So, if a system is a feedback control system, 
then it is an information processing system.        
3. Modal Computationalisms
 
Piccinini and Bahar (2012) defend two forms of computationalism: generic 
and sui generis (neither digital nor analog). They defend computationalism 
as the thesis that the nervous system computes in the generic and in a 
sui generis sense. But there is another question we can ask regarding the 
relation between computation and the nervous system. We know that actual 
neural computation, spike train processing, can be realized in very different 
physical bases (neural tissue or silicon based circuits, for example) (Craver 
2010). We therefore know that the specific physical basis in which actual 
neural computers are realized is not constitutive of them. The fact that 
the neural processes have certain functionally relevant feature F, among 
others, does not imply that it cannot be realized in a system that has the 
other features, but not F. If the nervous system can be realized that way, 
then F is a contingent feature of it. If not, it is a constitutive one. We can 
ask the same question of realizability not regarding the relation between 
neural processing and its specific physical basis, but regarding the relation 
between neural processing and neural computation itself. Can neural 
processing be realized in a basis that is not a sui generis (neither analog 
nor digital) computer, the kind of computing system that (according to 
Piccinini and Bahar) performs actual neural processing? A negative answer 
to this question can constitute a form of sui generis computationalism: the 
thesis that sui generis computation is constitutive of neural processing. In 
section 3.1, I argue that this thesis is false. There is also a second question 
we can ask regarding neural computation. Even if it turns out, as I believe 
it will, that neural processing can be realized in a system that is not a sui 
generis computer, we can still ask whether it can be realized in a system 
that is not computational at all. A negative answer to this question can 
constitute a form of generic computationalism, the thesis that computation 
is constitutive of neural processing. In section 3.2, I argue that this thesis is 
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also false.  
3.1. Constitutive sui generis Computation 
 
Piccinini and Bahar (2012) argue for sui generis computationalism, the 
thesis that neural computation is neither digital nor analog, but sui generis. 
Let us first see how we can define analog and digital computation. Roughly 
speaking, abstract digital computation is the manipulation of strings of 
discrete elements of finitely many types. Here we want to determine what 
kind of computation, if any, can be realized in the nervous system. Thus, we 
are interested primarily in concrete digital computation, or physical digital 
computation. These discrete elements may be physically implemented by 
what we call ‘digits.’ In a first approximation, concrete digital computation 
is the processing of sequences of digits according to general rules defined 
over the digits (Piccinini 2007). A digit, the atomic vehicle of concrete 
digital computation, is a macroscopic state (of a component of the system) 
whose type can be reliably and unambiguously distinguished by the system 
from other macroscopic types. A large number of possible microscopic 
states corresponds to each (macroscopic) digit type. For instance, a 
huge number of distinct arrangements of electrons (microscopic states) 
correspond to the same charge stored in a capacitor (macroscopic state). 
Artificial digital systems are engineered so as to treat all those microscopic 
states in one way: that which corresponds to their (macroscopic) digit type. 
No further physical properties of a physical medium are relevant to whether 
they implement digits. Thus, digits can be implemented by any physical 
medium with the right degrees of freedom. This is why Piccinini and Bahar 
(2012) maintain that vehicles of digital computation have what they take to 
be the common feature of computational vehicles: medium independence. 
Digital computation is often contrasted with analog computation. 
Piccinini and Scarantino (2011) observe that the clearest notion of analog 
computation is that of Pour-El (Pour-El 1974, Rubel 1993, Mills 2008). 
According to this notion, abstract analog computers are systems that 
manipulate continuous variables to solve certain systems of differential 
equations. Continuous variables are variables that can vary continuously 
over time and take any real values within certain intervals. As digital 
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abstract computers, analog computers can also be physically implemented, 
and physically implemented continuous variables are different kinds 
of vehicles than strings of digits. While a digital computing system can 
always unambiguously distinguish digits and their types from one another, 
a concrete analog computing system cannot do the same with the exact 
values of (physically implemented) continuous variables. This is because 
the values of continuous variables can only be measured within a margin 
of error. A major consequence is that analog computations (in the present, 
strict sense) are a different kind of process than digital computations. 
While digits are unambiguously distinguishable vehicles, concrete analog 
computers cannot unambiguously distinguish between any two portions of 
the continuous variables they manipulate. Since the variables can take any 
real values, but there is a lower bound to the sensitivity of any system, it is 
always possible that the difference between two portions of a continuous 
variable is small enough to go undetected by the system. From this, it 
follows that the vehicles of analog computation are not strings of digits. 
Nevertheless, analog computations are only sensitive to the differences 
between portions of the variables being manipulated to the degree that 
they can be distinguished by the system. Any further physical properties 
of the media implementing the variables are irrelevant to the computation. 
Like digital computers, therefore, analog computers operate on medium-
independent vehicles.
Piccinini and Scarantino (2011) point out that, in recent decades, the 
analogy between brains and computers has taken hold in neuroscience. 
Many neuroscientists have started using the term ‘computation’ for the 
processing of neuronal spike trains, that is, sequences of spikes produced 
by neurons in real time. The processing of neuronal spike trains by 
neural systems is often called ‘neural computation.’ Taking the types of 
computation that Piccinini and Scarantino have distinguished, there are two 
main questions that we can ask regarding neural computation: 
(1) Is the brain a computer in the generic sense?
(2)  If the brain is a computer in the generic sense, is neural computation 
best regarded as a form of digital computation, analog computation, 
or something else? 
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Piccinini and Bahar (2012) argue that the nervous system is neither an 
analog nor a digital computer. Since they also argue that the nervous system 
is computational in the generic sense, it follows that it is a sui generis 
computer. Let’s briefly consider the main theses of analog and digital 
computationalism. Analog computationalism is committed to the view that 
the functionally significant signals manipulated by the nervous system are 
continuous variables and that the main tool for processing neural signals 
are integrators. Piccinini and Bahar (2012) point to several aspects of neural 
processing that suggest that it could be some kind of analog computation. 
Brains and analog computers both appear to have an essentially continuous 
dynamic, that is, their vehicles must be assumed to vary over real time 
in order to construct successful scientific theories of them (for the case 
of brains, see Dayan and Abbott 2001, Ermentrout and Terman 2010).. 
Neuronal inputs—i.e., neurotransmitters and hormones—are most usefully 
modeled as continuous variables. In addition, their release and uptake is 
modulated by chemical receptors that operate continuously in real time. 
Also, neuronal dendrites and at least some neuronal axons transmit graded 
potentials—that is, more or less continuously varying voltage changes. 
In these respects, Piccinini and Bahar agree that brains appear to be more 
similar to analog computers than to digital ones.
However, they note that there is at least one crucial disanalogy between 
brains and analog computers:  
Typically, if the total graded input signal received by a neuron is above 
a certain threshold, the neuron fires a spike. If the total signal received 
by a neuron is below the threshold, no spike is fired. As a consequence 
of the all-or-none character of the spike, computational neuroscience 
focuses on firing rates and spike timing as the most significant 
functional variables at the level of circuit and network. Thus, while 
firing threshold is subject to modulation by continuous variables (e.g., 
ion concentrations), firing rates vary in a graded way, and spike timing 
(in real time) may be functionally significant, none of these aspects of 
neural signals amounts to the use of continuous variables as vehicles 
within analog computers. (2011, p. 15)
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On the other hand, digital computationalism can be traced back to the work 
of McCulloch and Pitts. They attempted to explain cognitive phenomena in 
terms of putative neural processes. McCulloch and Pitts (1943) introduced 
concepts and techniques from logic and computability theory to model what 
is functionally relevant to the activity of neurons and neural nets in such a 
way that (in our terminology) a neural spike can be treated mathematically 
as a digit, and a set of spikes can be treated as a string of digits. McCulloch 
and Pitts’s empirical justification for their theory was the similarity 
between digits and spikes. Spikes appear to be discrete or digital, i.e., to 
a first approximation, their occurrence is an unambiguous event relative 
to the functioning of the system. This was the main motivation behind 
McCulloch’s identification between spikes and atomic mental events, 
leading to his formulation of digital computationalism (Piccinini 2004). 
Piccinini and Bahar (2012) offer exhaustive considerations against the 
possibility of typing spikes (or even spike rates) as digits and describing 
spike trains as strings of digits. Their considerations go so far as to consider 
a breadth of relevant theoretical possibilities and are therefore too extensive 
to be presented here. Since the thesis I will defend is independent of the 
one that these considerations support, it is not necessary to assess them. 
I said earlier in this section that there are two questions regarding neural 
computation given Piccinini and Scarantino’s elucidation. The first question 
is about neural processing as generic computation and, as we will see in the 
next section, Piccinini and Bahar answer positively. Thereby, the second 
question is, given a positive answer to the first question,  about the specific 
kind of computation performed by the nervous system. Piccinini and Bahar 
argue against the digital or analog character of neural computation. They 
affirm that neural computation is sui generis. I will argue that although 
nerual processing is performed actually by a sui generis computer, this is 
not constitutively so. In other words, neural processing can be realized by 
either a digital or an analog computer.
In order to argue for or against a thesis about the constitutive character of 
a feature of neural processing, one has to find a way to distinguish between 
constitutive and contingent features. Regarding different properties of 
action potentials, we have the criterion of functional relevance. Spike rates 
and timing are the variables correlated with different causes and effects 
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inside and outside the nervous system, and they do not need to be realized 
in neural tissue. I believe that there is also such a criterion regarding the 
processes performed by different systems of a biological organism and, in 
particular, regarding different features related to the processes performed 
by the nervous system and discussed by Piccinini and Bahar (2012). I will 
claim that feedback control is constitutive of neural processing in a way that 
the different kinds of computation and information processing are not. I 
showed, in section 2.2, that feedback control entails information processing. 
So, information processing will be also constitutive of neural processing 
(although indirectly). Nevertheless, I will show that feedback control does 
not entail sui generis computation, and so sui generis computation is not 
constitutive of neural processing. 
Piccinini and Bahar (2012) do not seem interested in computationalism 
as a thesis about the constitutive character of a feature of the neural 
processing. They argue for the thesis that the nervous system computes 
in some sense without considering the possibility that neural processing 
be realized in a system that is not computational in that same sense. I 
will return to this aspect of Piccinini’s position later. What is important to 
acknowledge here is that the two forms of sui generis computationalism 
have some independence. If it turns out, as I think it will, that sui generis 
computation is not constitutive of neural processing, there still remains the 
fact established by Piccinini and Bahar that the nervous system is in fact a 
computer of this kind. 
The peculiar function discovered in the nervous system, negative feedback 
control, has something in common with the main functions of the other 
systems of human organisms. This similarity, however, is not shared by 
other features ascribed to the nervous system, such as being computational 
or being an information processing system. To execute negative feedback 
control over larger system S of which it is a part, a system S1 (1) must cause 
states in S (control the behavior of S) in a way that depends on previous 
states of S itself or its environment caused by S1, and (2) the output of S1 (the 
behavior of S) must reach an equilibrium value from a process that causally 
depends on previous non-equilibrium values of S1’s output itself. So, the 
feedback control function, as the main function of other systems in human 
organisms, determines a way in which a system relates to the organism of 
277Modal Considerations on Information Processing and Computation ~
which is a part and to whose behavior it contributes. Thus, feedback control 
is constitutive of the nervous system (and of neural processing) in a way 
that information processing and computation are not. 
The fact that the nervous system is a computational or an information 
processing system says nothing about the way that system will interact 
with the rest of the organism or contribute to its behavior. Regarding 
information, as we have seen, we only need their states to carry information 
and the states that carry different information to have different causal roles. 
But those roles do not determine some specific output; there is no specific 
way an informational system must contribute to the behavior of a larger 
system it forms a part of. Regarding computation, the same point applies: as 
long as a computational system manipulates vehicles of restricted functional 
relevance, there is no specific output that every computational system that 
is part of a larger system should have. On the contrary, to characterize a 
system as a feedback control system, one needs to characterize the causal 
correlation between values of its output, i.e., values of the variable that is 
connected with what is beyond the system. To characterize something as 
a feedback system, we have to specify the way it interacts with what is 
beyond it. It is because of this that feedback control is the only of these 
three features (computation, information processing, and feedback control) 
that we can demand for the realization of a nervous system or a neural 
process. Feedback control is the only one of these three features that 
characterizes the nervous system as a system of a given organism (and 
neural processes as processes of a system of a given organism). 
Therefore, if  feedback can be performed by a non-sui generis 
computational system, then sui generis computation is not constitutive of 
neural processing. On the contrary, if feedback control cannot be performed 
by a system that is not a sui generis computer, this feature will be also 
(indirectly) constitutive of neural processing. As we have seen, Piccinini and 
Bahar (2012) argue that the nervous system is actually neither a digital nor 
an analog computer. Despite this fact, the neural processing can be realized 
in this kind of computing system; what we call “neural process” can be 
performed by a digital or analog computer. Sui generis computation is not 
constitutive of neural processing. 
To determine whether the neural processing can be realized by a digital 
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or an analog computer, we first have to decide whether feedback control 
can be performed by a digital or an analog computer. We have seen that 
neural feedback control is the function of controlling the behavior of an 
organism in response to stimuli coming from states of the organism’s body 
and environment that are an effect of the feedback system itself. So, for a 
nervous system to be realized by a digital or an analog computer, digits or 
strings of digits and continuous variables must be able to cause states in an 
organism in response to the stimuli coming from states of the organism’s 
body or environment caused by strings of digits or continuous variables. 
Of course, not every feedback control system that processes digits or 
continuous variables will be a nervous system. It is also necessary for the 
system to form part of an organism. 
We have seen that negative feedback control, even in its more narrow 
characterization (the one that included the properties of equifinality and 
compensation) did not require that its variables be non-continuous or non-
discrete. The only structural restriction that these requisites impose on 
feedback vehicles is that they must be variables capable of going back to 
an equilibrium value from an arbitrarily large set of non-equilibrium values 
and that the process of a variable of going back below a threshold depends 
on the increase of the values of other variables. Some possible changes 
in the value of the variables and some specific correlation between those 
changes are the only conditions required. But given these restrictions, it is 
perfectly possible that these variables be discrete or continuous as digital or 
analog computation requires. Therefore, feedback control does not imply 
sui generis computation. Any computational vehicle, including digital and 
analog vehicles, can perform negative feedback control in a given organism. 
A form of sui generis computationalism, the thesis that sui generis 
computation is constitutive of neural processing, is false.  
3.2. Constitutive Generic Computation 
Piccinini and Bahar (2012) arrived at the conclusion that the nervous 
system is actually a sui generis computer, arguing that the nervous system 
is neither a digital nor an analog computer and that the nervous system is 
a computer in the generic sense. In section 3.1, I argued that sui generis 
computation is not constitutive of neural processing. It can be realized by an 
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analog or a digital computer. In this section, I will argue that computation 
in the generic sense is not constitutive of neural processing either. First, 
let’s briefly consider Piccinini and Bahar’s arguments for actual generic 
computationalism.
The first argument is called the ‘argument from the functional 
organization of the nervous system.’ The idea is that since (i) neural 
processes are defined over medium independent vehicles and (ii) the 
processing of medium independent vehicles constitutes computation in the 
generic sense, then it follows that (iii) neural processes are computations 
in the generic sense. Premise (ii) is the result of Piccinini and Scarantino’s 
elucidation of generic computation. So, Piccinini and Bahar only need to 
argue for premise (i). They do so by pointing out that current evidence 
indicates that the primary vehicles manipulated by neural processes are 
neuronal spikes (action potentials) and that the functionally relevant 
aspects of neural processes depend on dynamical aspects of spikes such 
as spike rates and spike timing. Only these dimensions of variation of 
their vehicles, not any more specific property, are functionally relevant for 
neural processes. This means, according to Piccinini and Bahar, that action 
potentials are medium independent. 
I argued above that computational vehicles are not defined by their 
medium independence, but rather by their restricted functional relevance. 
So, as premise (ii) is false, from premises (i) and (ii), conclusion (iii) 
does not follow. The fact that vehicles of neural processing are medium 
independent does not imply that they are computational. Nevertheless, 
the evidence that Piccinini and Bahar offer for premise (ii) also supports 
the thesis that vehicles of neural processing have not only medium 
independence, but also restricted functional relevance. So, we can argue 
for generic computation by reformulating premise (i) as the thesis that 
computation is the manipulation of vehicles of restricted functional 
relevance, and reformulating premise (ii) as the thesis that actual neural 
processing consists of the manipulation of vehicles of restricted functional 
relevance. These two premises establish generic computation. 
The second argument is called ‘the argument from information 
processing.’ Piccinini and Bahar affirm that since (i) neural processes 
process semantic information, and (ii) the processing of semantic 
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information requires generic computation, then it follows that (iii) neural 
processes are computations in the generic sense. Here, both premises 
require some argumentation. Regarding premise (i), Piccinini and 
Bahar maintain that cognition involves the processing of information 
in the three senses I mentioned earlier. First, mutual information, as a 
measure of the statistical dependency between a source and a receiver in 
Shannon’s theory (Shannon and Weaver 1949), is often used to quantify 
the statistical dependence between neural signals and their sources and 
to estimate the coding efficiency of neural signals (Dayan and Abbott 
2001, ch. 4; Baddeley et al. 2000). There is also evidence that shows that 
neural signals carry natural semantic information. It is experimentally 
well established that neural variables carry natural semantic information 
about other internal and external variables (Adrian 1928; Rieke et al. 1999; 
cf. Garson 2003). Much of contemporary neurophysiology centers on the 
discovery and manipulation of neural variables that correlate reliably—
and often usefully—with variables external to the nervous system. 
Lastly, Piccinini and Bahar affirm that many theories in cognitive science 
assume that nervous systems possess and process representations. In their 
interpretation, this means that the nervous system possesses and processes 
non-natural semantic information. Specifically, they say it is difficult to 
explain language processing and other higher cognitive processes without 
postulating representations. 
Regarding premise (ii), Piccinini and Bahar affirm that information, in the 
three senses mentioned above, is a medium-independent notion:  
Processing information means processing vehicles on the basis of the 
information they carry rather than their specific physical properties. 
And the information carried by a signal is defined independently of 
the physical medium that implements the signal. Thus, processing 
information requires processing vehicles that are defined in a 
medium-independent way. Thus, information processing entails 
generic computation. (The converse does not hold because medium-
independent vehicles need not carry any information.) (p. 12)
So, as neuronal spikes carry information in the three main senses, and the 
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vehicles of information are medium independent, Piccinini and Bahar 
conclude that the nervous system is computational in the generic sense. 
Premise (ii), that the processing of semantic information requires 
computation, is more complex that it may seem. It contains three different 
claims: (a) that vehicles of semantic information processing are medium 
independent, (b) that vehicles of generic computation are medium 
independent, and (c) that this common feature makes informational 
vehicles computational. As we have seen, Piccinini and Bahar are correct 
in claiming (a) and (b). The vehicles of information processing and 
computation are medium independent. Despite the common feature of 
medium independence, however, (c) is false. There is no implication from 
information processing to generic computation, because the medium 
independence of an informational vehicle type is compatible with no 
restricted functional relevance of some of its tokens. The argument, then, 
does not work. Nevertheless, as I believe that my reformulation of the first 
does work, generic computationalism is true.
What about modal generic computationalism, the thesis that neural 
processing cannot be realized in a system that is not computational in the 
generic sense? I argued above that feedback control is the constitutive 
feature of the nervous system. I also argued that, as feedback control 
implies information processing but not computation, and because 
information processing does not imply computation either, computation is 
not constitutive of feedback control. Feedback control can be performed 
by a non-computational system. From these premises, I can conclude that 
computation in the generic sense is not constitutive of neural processing. 
Generic computationalism, as a thesis that generic computation is a 
constitutive feature of neural processing, is false. 
Piccinini and Bahar (2012) do not seem interested in this form of 
computationalism. They do not consider the possibility that neural 
processing can be realized in a system that is not computational in the 
generic sense or any other more specific sense. As we have seen, part of 
their two arguments for generic computationalism is conceptual. The first 
argument depends on the conceptual elucidation of generic computation as 
the manipulation of medium independent vehicles. The second argument 
depends on the same thesis and also on the idea that information processing 
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conceptually implies manipulation of medium independent vehicles. These 
conceptual relations describe constitutive relations between properties. An 
information processing system cannot be realized in a system that does 
not manipulate medium independent vehicles. A generic computational 
system cannot be realized by a system that does not manipulate medium 
independent vehicles, nor can medium independent vehicle processing (in 
Piccinini and Bahar’s view) be realized in a system that is not a generic 
computer. The other relevant premises of the argument are empirical. They 
are the empirically well-established facts that the nervous system processes 
medium independent vehicles and that the nervous system processes 
information. But no argument is offered to the effect that these empirically 
discovered features are constitutive of the nervous system itself. If the 
neural processing can be realized by a system that does not manipulate 
medium independent vehicles, despite the conceptual relations established 
by Piccinini and Bahar, neural processing could be realizable by a system 
that is not computational in the generic sense. 
The argument I offer rests also on an empirical premise, that the nervous 
system is in fact a feedback control system, and three conceptual premises, 
the fact that feedback control conceptually entails information processing 
and that neither feedback control nor information processing imply 
computation. But, unlike Piccinini and Bahar’s argument, the empirical 
premise comes together with a philosophical or conceptual insight about 
the constitutive character of the feature empirically discovered (negative 
feedback control). 
To conclude this section, it is important to notice a peculiarity of the 
relation between modal generic computationalism and modal sui generis 
computationalism. Modal sui generis computationalism can be understood 
in two ways: first, as the thesis that neural processing cannot be realized in 
a system that is not a sui generis computer. But it also can be understood 
as the thesis that if the neural processing is realized in a computational 
system, then it is realized in a sui generis computer. The falsity of generic 
computationalism implies the falsity of the first form of sui generis 
computationalism, but not the falsity of the second. If the neural processing 
can be realized by a system that is not computational at all, then it can be 
realized in a system that is not a sui generis computer. However, even if the 
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nervous system can be realized in a system that is not computational at all, 
it could be the case that the only kind of computational system in which 
it can be realized is sui generis. To argue against the second form of sui 
generis computationalism, we need the argument I offered in the previous 
section, to the effect that the neural processing can be realized by an analog 
or digital computing system. This is why the argument in this section cannot 
substitute the one in the previous section. I want to argue against both forms 
of constitutive sui generis computationalism, and in order to challenge the 
second version, the argument in section 3.1 is required.
4. Conclusion
In the first part of this paper, I have developed two main arguments. 
First, that computation cannot be defined as the manipulation of medium 
independent vehicles, but rather the manipulation of vehicles that have 
what I call ‘restricted functional relevance.’ Second, I defended two ideas 
that show that the line between computation and information is actually 
wider than the current debate on computationalism would suggest. I have 
argued against Piccinini and Scarantino (2011) that it is not only the case 
that computation and information are different concepts, but also that 
information processing does not imply computation. The main idea was that 
any given informational vehicle type can be realized by a token that has no 
restricted functional relevance. I then argued that information processing 
is more closely related to the nervous system than computation is, because 
only the former is constitutive of the peculiar function of the system. I 
showed that even a weak notion of negative feedback control implies 
information processing, but that even a strong notion of feedback control 
does not imply computation. 
In the second part of the paper, I used these previous results to consider 
different forms of computationalism. I challenged a form of the kinds of 
computationalism that Piccinini and Bahar (2012) defended. However, 
as ‘computationalism’ was understood here in a different sense than that 
accepted by Piccinini and Bahar, my theses are compatible with theirs. 
First, I argued against a form of sui generis computationalism. I presented 
reasons to believe that feedback control is constitutive of the nervous 
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system in a way that information processing and computation are not. Then 
I showed that, since feedback control is compatible with digital and analog 
computation, the neural processing can be realized by an analog or a digital 
computer. Sui generis computation is not constitutive of neural processing. 
Finally, I questioned a form of generic computationalism. As I established 
that feedback control vehicles can be realized in tokens that are not 
computational at all, it follows that generic computation is not constitutive 
of neural processing.    
My two main aims were to clarify several conceptual theses that are 
important to the debate on computationalism and also to offer answers 
to new questions regarding computation in the nervous system. First, I 
intended to go deeper into the characterization of computation, the relation 
between computation and information, and the relation that they both have 
with the nervous system. Second, I evaluated computationalism as the 
thesis that generic and sui generis computation are constitutive of neural 
processing. I believe that these theses are more deeply philosophical without 
being any less naturalistic. As we have seen, they depend on considerations 
that determine a criterion of multiple realizability for the nervous system. 
This allows for a defense of the theses about neural processing that goes 
beyond what actual neural processing is. These theses were answers to 
the question of whether the neural processing can be realized in a system 
that lacks some properties that actual nervous systems have. Nevertheless, 
the criterion of multiple realizability demands that we determine, among 
the properties empirically discovered in the nervous system, the ones 
necessarily required for the realization of neural processes.  
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